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Abstract  In	   February	   2011	   a	   severe	   earthquake	   devastated	   Christchurch,	   New	   Zealand	   and	   the	  surrounding	   Canterbury	   region,	   killing	   185	   people,	   injuring	   hundreds,	   and	   severely	  damaging	   the	   city.	   One	   prominent	   disaster	   response,	   the	   Christchurch	   Recovery	   Map	  (CRM),	  modelled	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   a	   crisis	   commons,	  was	   populated	   by	   social	   network	  users	  drawing	  upon	  their	  immediate	  local	  knowledge	  of	  the	  disaster	  site.	  This	  paper	  draws	  on	  in-­‐‑depth	  interviews	  with	  government	  officials,	  an	  IT	  professional	   involved	  in	  advising	  government	  about	  crises,	  and	  a	  key	  organizer	  of	  the	  CRM.	  A	  key	  aim	  of	  the	  interviews	  was	  to	  understand	  how	  these	  actors	  perceived	  the	  CRM,	  the	  value	  they	  attached	  to	  it	  and	  the	  challenges	   it	   posed	   for	   government	   agencies.	   Our	   analysis	   identified	   the	   following	  interrelated	   themes:	   information	   and	   identity	   control;	   generalized	   versus	   localized	  information;	  transparency	  and	  trust;	  and	  blurring	  the	  lines	  of	  expertise.	  CRM	  provides	  an	  example	  of	  the	  important	  role	  volunteer,	  citizen-­‐‑led	  initiatives	  using	  new	  technologies	  can	  play	   in	   assisting	   official	   efforts	   to	   inform	   communities	   during	   and	   after	   a	   disaster.	   	   The	  government	  rebuffed	  CRM’s	  key	  organizer,	  Tim	  McNamara,	  when	  he	  requested	  a	  meeting	  to	  discuss	  government	  concerns	  about	  the	  trustworthiness	  of	  CRM	  information.	  The	  paper	  explores	   what	   can	   be	   learned	   from	   this	   clash	   for	   future	   disaster	   preparedness	   through	  interviews	  with	  McNamara	  and	  key	  government	  officials. 
 
Introduction On	  22	  February	  2011,	  an	  earthquake	  of	  magnitude	  6.3	  (Ml)	  devastated	  New	  Zealand’s	  third	  most	  populous	  city,	  Christchurch,	  and	  the	  surrounding	  Canterbury	  region.	  One	  of	  the	   authors	   of	   this	   paper	   felt	   an	   aftershock	   move	   his	   office	   on	   the	   sixth	   floor	   of	   a	  building	  at	   the	  University	  of	  Otago,	  approximately	  400	  kilometres	   from	   the	  epicentre.	  The	   earthquake	   killed	   185	   people,	   injured	   hundreds,	   some	   seriously,	   and	   severely	  damaged	  the	  city.	  Rebuilding	  Christchurch	  has	  been	  estimated	  to	  cost	  in	  excess	  of	  $NZ	  20	  billion	  ($US	  16	  billion)	  making	  this	  earthquake	  NZ’s	  costliest	  natural	  disaster.	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Initial	  disaster	  response	  was	  offered	  by	  local	  citizens	  and	  available	  emergency	  services	  and	   within	   hours	   a	   national	   rescue	   effort	   was	   coordinated	   from	   the	   National	   Crisis	  Management	   Centre	   in	   Wellington,	   the	   country’s	   capital.	   This	   paper	   focuses	   on	   one	  aspect	  of	  the	  disaster	  response,	  the	  Christchurch	  Recovery	  Map	  (CRM),	  as	  an	  example	  of	  the	  important	  role	  volunteer,	  citizen-­‐‑led	  initiatives	  using	  new	  technologies	  can	  play	  in	  informing	  communities	  during	  and	  after	  disaster	  and	  emergency	  situations	  (Figure	  1).	  Modelled	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  crisis	  commons,	  the	  map	  was	  populated	  by	  data	  drawn	  from	  the	   crowd;	   that	   is,	   social	   network	   users	   drawing	   upon	   their	   local	   knowledge	   and	  technical	  expertise.	  But	  what	  were	   the	  responses	  of	  government	  and	  other	  officials	   to	  this	   citizen-­‐‑led	   initiative?	   While	   researching	   the	   role	   of	   experts	   in	   dealing	   with	   risk	  events	  we	  identified	  a	  website	  that	  posted	  email	  exchanges	  between	  officials	  involved	  in	  the	   NZ	   government	   response	   to	   the	   2011	   earthquake	   and	   Tim	   McNamara,	   the	   key	  organizer	  of	  CRM.	  The	  heading	  was	  provocative:	  ‘We	  are	  in	  an	  emergency	  situation	  and	  cannot	  meet	  with	  you’	  (Gruen	  2011).	  McNamara’s	  request	  to	  meet	  government	  officials	  about	  their	  concerns	  with	  CRM	  had	  been	  refused.	  	  
	  
Figure 1: The CRM was a real-time, interactive map of earthquake-affected areas displaying 
locations of essential services and their times of operation. (Image courtesy of Julian Carver 
2015)  





New Media and Disasters There	   is	  a	  growing	  body	  of	  research	  on	  the	  role	  of	  new	  media	  (internet,	  social	  media,	  mobile	  phones,	  etc.)	  during	  natural	  disasters	  (see,	  for	  example:	  Skuse	  and	  Brimacombe	  2014;	  Veil,	  Buehner	  and	  Palenchar	  2011).	  Much	  work	  is	  evaluative	  in	  documenting	  and	  assessing	  the	  nature	  and	  extent	  of	  the	  uses	  of	  these	  technologies	  by	  citizens.	  Hjorth	  and	  Kim	   (2011),	   for	   example,	   examined	   the	   use	   of	   social	   media	   in	   maintaining	   social	  relationships	  among	  residents	  living	  in	  Tokyo	  during	  the	  2011	  earthquake	  and	  tsunami.	  Similarly,	   Bruns	   (2011)	   examined	   the	   rapid	   emergence	   of	   online	   citizen	   interactions	  during	  the	  2011	  floods	  in	  Queensland,	  Australia,	  and	  argues	  (2011,	  48)	  for	  the	  value	  of	  going	  beyond	  mainstream	  approaches	   to	  building	  government-­‐‑to-­‐‑citizen	  or	   citizen-­‐‑to-­‐‑citizen	   engagement	   to	   ‘analyse	   the	   rapid	   ad	   hoc	   forms	   of	   participatory	   organisation	  which	  are	  forged	  in	  a	  more	  distributed	  fashion	  during	  acute	  events’.	  Macias,	  Hilyard	  and	  Freimuth	  (2009)	  content	  analysed	  a	  multistage	  sample	  of	  blogs	  during	  the	  two	  weeks	  after	   Hurricane	   Katrina	   catastrophically	   damaged	   New	   Orleans	   in	   August	   2005.	   The	  study	   documented	   the	   use	   of	   blogs	   in	   filtering	   and	   linking	   information	   about	   rescue	  efforts,	   listing	   missing	   persons,	   finding	   assistance,	   and	   providing	   information	   on	  government	  responses.	  	  	  Of	   direct	   relevance	   to	   our	   study	   is	   the	  more	   than	  decade	   long	   systematic	   program	  of	  research	   by	   Palen	   and	   colleagues	   on	  what	   is	   termed	   ‘crisis	   informatics’	   (for	   example	  Palen,	  et.	  al.	  2010;	  Palen	  et	  al.	  2009;	  Sutton,	  Palen,	  and	  Shklovski,	  2009;	  Shklovski,	  Palen	  and	  Sutton,	  2008;	  Hughes,	  et	  al.	  2008;	  Palen	  and	  Liu	  2007;	  Palen,	  Hiltz	  and	  Liu	  2007).	  This	   research	   draws	   on	   previous	   sociological	   disaster	   research	   (for	   example:	  Quarantelli	   2008,	   873)	   that	   examines	   the	   role	   of	   local	   citizens,	   usually	   the	   first	  responders	   at	   times	   of	   disaster,	   and	   challenges	   commonly	   held	   myths	   about	   public	  responses.	   More	   than	   25	   years	   ago	   before	   the	   advent	   of	   mobile	   digital	   platforms,	  Stallings	   and	   Quarantelli	   (1985,	   94)	   identified	   what	   they	   labelled	   ‘emergent	   citizen	  groups’	   that	   take	   shape	   around	   perceived	   needs	   or	   problems	   associated	   with	   both	  natural	   and	   technological	   disasters.	   Their	   term	   reflects	   the	   lack	   of	   formal	   social	  structure,	  their	  newness,	  and	  their	  often	  ephemeral	  nature.	  In	  a	  prescient	  observation,	  they	   noted	   (1985,	   94)	   that	   emergent	   citizen	   groups	   are	   usually	   ignored	   by	   public	  officials	   who	   do	   not	   take	   them	   into	   account	   in	   formal	   disaster	   preparedness	   plans,	  despite	  the	  likelihood	  they	  will	  play	  a	  ‘more	  prominent	  role	  in	  the	  future’.	  	  In	   the	   digital	   era,	   elaborating	   this	   direction,	   Palen	   (2010)	   challenges	   the	  mainstream	  view	  about	  how	  information	  should	  be	  controlled	  and	  communicated	  during	  a	  disaster.	  She	   advocates	   ‘reframing	   emergency	   response	   as	   a	   socially-­‐‑distributed	   information	  system’	   such	   that	   publically	   available	   computer-­‐‑mediated	   communications	   including	  community	   websites,	   blogs,	   Twitter,	   social	   networking	   sites,	   mapping	   sites,	   etc.	   are	  integrated	  into	  official	  systems	  to	  empower	  citizens	  to	   ‘assess	  context,	  validity,	  source	  credibility,	  and	  timeliness	  to	  make	  the	  best	  decisions	  for	  their	  highly	  localized,	  changing	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conditions’	  (Palen	  et	  al.	  2010,	  2).	  Palen	  recognizes	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  clash	  between	  the	  imperatives	   of	   official	   (normally	   government)	   information	   and	   ‘publically-­‐‑available,	  grassroots,	  peer	  generated	   information’	  but	   she	  holds	  great	  promise	   for	  her	  model	  of	  inclusive	   public	   participation	   (Palen,	   Hiltz	   and	   Liu	   2007,	   57).	   Palen’s	   model	   both	  emphasises	   the	   beneficial	   contribution	   from	   increasingly	   ubiquitous	   ICT,	   and	   an	  associated	   heightened	   risk	   of	   ‘ineffectively	   managed’	   crises	   if	   potential	   new	  informational	   relationships	   between	   officials	   and	   the	   public	   are	   not	   pursued	   (Palen,	  Hiltz	  and	  Liu	  2007,	  58).	  	  	  	  Palen	   and	   her	   colleagues	   give	   numerous	   examples—ranging	   from	   the	   2007	   Southern	  California	  wildfires,	  to	  Hurricane	  Katrina,	  to	  preparation	  for	  an	  Avian	  influenza	  (h5n5)	  outbreak—of	  the	  active	  and	  dynamic	  roles	  of	  local	  citizens	  in	  creating	  ad	  hoc	  systems	  to	  provide	  localized	  information	  to	  suit	  their	  immediate	  needs.	  	  	  This	  research	  parallels	  recent	  developments	  in	  risk	  theory	  examining	  the	  clash	  between	  and	   within	   expert	   systems	   of	   knowledge	   (scientists,	   technologists,	   government,	   etc.)	  and	  lay	  peoples’	  knowledges.	  	  	  	  	  
Risk Communication Palenchar’s	   (2009)	   historical	   review	   of	   risk	   and	   crisis	   communication	   developments	  traces	   a	   move	   away	   from	   sender-­‐‑receiver	   communicative	   models	   to	   more	   audience-­‐‑centred	  perspectives.	  These	  dialogic	  approaches	  stand	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  earlier	  ‘one-­‐‑way,	  top-­‐‑down	  expert-­‐‑to-­‐‑public’	  models	  as	  exemplified	  by	  Palen,	  Hiltz	  and	  Liu’s	  (2007,	  55)	   dismissal	   of	   the	   ‘idealized	   linear	   depiction	   of	   information	  dissemination	   .	   .	   .	   from	  authority	  to	  news	  events	  to	  the	  public.’	  Communication	  conceptualized	  as	  information-­‐‑transfer	   is	   replaced	   with	   more	   interactive	   processes	   designed	   to	   empower	   various	  publics.	  	  	  This	   shift	   towards	   participatory	   or	   dialogic	   models	   is	   theoretically	   underpinned	   by	  Wynne’s	   (1996)	   seminal	   critique	  of	  Beck’s	   (1992)	  original	   ‘risk	   society’	   thesis	   and	  by	  concurrent	  and	  subsequent	  research	  by	  Giddens	  (1990;	  1991;	  1994)	  and	  Lash	  (1994a;	  1994b).	   In	  essence,	  Wynne	  (1996,	  60)	  documents	  how	  expert	  or	  technical	  assessment	  of	  risk	  embodies	  assumptions	  and	  commitments	  that	  are	  neither	  neutral	  or	  value	  free.	  As	   a	   consequence,	   expert	   systems	   often	   neglect	   and	   denigrate	   lay	   perspectives	   and	  define	   resistance	   to	   expert	   assessment	   as	   irrational	   or	   ignorant.	   Thus,	   he	   observes	  (1996,	   70)	   that	  while	   risks	  may	   be	   debated	   at	   the	   level	   of	   scientific	   or	   technological	  expertise	  and	  public	  accountability,	  they	  are	  dealt	  with	  by	  most	  people	  as	  individuals	  in	  specific	   situations	   at	   the	   local	   level	   in	   their	   everyday	   lives.	   It	   is	   therefore	   critical	   to	  explore	  how	  perceptions	  of	   risks	  are	  constructed	  by	   local,	  or	  as	  he	   terms	   it	   ‘situated’,	  knowledge,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  expert	  knowledge.	  This	  does	  not	  imply	  a	  hierarchy	  because	  the	  perspectives	   of	   all	   stakeholders	   are	   important	   whether	   they	   be	   of	   expert	   or	   lay.	   In	  criticizing	   Beck	   for	   neglecting	   lay	   knowledge,	   Wynne	   argues	   (1996,	   70)	   that	   lay	  knowledge	  tends	  to	  be	  more	  contextual,	  localized,	  individualized,	  and	  reflexively	  aware	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In investigating the contextual background to the provocative email from government to Tim 
McNamara’s CRM, ‘We are in an emergency situation and cannot meet with you’, we sought 
data about the following questions: 
 
1. How did those involved in CRM and official public information management 
practices view the information needs of the community? 	  
2. How did this influence their views of their own and other forms of 
information provision in response to the earthquake?	  
3. What role could non-government specialist groups have in knowledge transfer 
activities following a natural disaster?	  	  
 
Our methodology involved inductively analysing secondary and primary data collected from 
news media reports, website content, departmental memos, and in-depth interviews with key 
actors involved in the email exchanges. We used multiple data collection methods to identify 
recurring significant themes, which we compared with those found in the literature 
addressing formal and alternative communication responses to natural disasters. We 
completed seven qualitative in-depth interviews of about 60 to 90 minutes each, in Auckland, 
Wellington and Christchurch, NZ. Four of the participants held positions within the Civil 
Defence Emergency Management section of the Department of Internal Affairs in 
Wellington. Two others worked in government on disaster recovery, and one, an IT 
professional, advised government about crises. The aim of these interviews was to understand 
the experiences and challenges they faced and their perceptions of the CRM. The participants 
have been de-identified in the analysis. To understand the processes involved in the creation, 
development and day-to-day operations of the CRM we interviewed Tim McNamara, the 
site’s key organizer.  
 
We recognize that our research team is largely distant from the on-going recovery and 
rebuilding in Christchurch and the Canterbury region. Our overall objective is to learn from 
the communications between CRM and government to better prepare for crisis in a digital era 
in New Zealand and elsewhere.    
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Christchurch Recovery Map 
The Christchurch Recovery Map (also known as eq.org.nz) was created in response to the 
February earthquake and contained information gathered via email, Twitter, SMS and locally 
based websites and was built with open source tools and active support of CrisisCommons  
and Ushahidi (Bourk & Holland 2014). Ushahidi (Swahili for testimony) was first developed 
to map reports of violence in Kenya in 2008 following the election. The Ushahidi platform 
combines crisis information from citizen generated reports, media and NGOs and facilitates 
early warning systems and assists in data visualization (geographical mapping tools) for crisis 
response and recovery.2 It is believed to be the most prominent platform used by crisis-
mapping and crowdsourcing organisations (Skuse & Brimacombe, 2014, 37). Beatson, 
Buettner and Schirato (2014) et al. citing McDougal (2012, 7) observe CRM is an 
amalgamation of three previous crisis maps, the outcome of self-organising and self-
deploying Volunteer and Technical Communities (V&TCs). As such, CRM is the result of a 
collaborative effort to ‘maximise efforts and reduce duplication’.  
  
The CRM provided a visual map of essential services, their location and opening times, and 
in the ten days of its operation received more than one hundred and fifty thousand hits, was 
embedded in the major daily broadsheet, the New Zealand Herald, and regularly accessed by 
major banking and other commercial institutions. It operated on a 24-7 basis, receiving and 
redistributing tweets and SMS messages, and converting the data to a relational database that 
could display visual information for each affected suburb (Beatson, Buettner and Schirato 
2014). In a comprehensive overview of CRM, Beatson et al describe in detail its logistics, 
structure and content. One of the developers who later emerged as the public face of CRM is 
Tim McNamara (2011).  
 
McNamara, who was working with the Intellectual Property Office when the earthquake 
struck, contacted several friends via Twitter and proposed they build a visual community map 
of current information essentially functioning as an ‘emergency information source’. 
McNamara received support from technical and commercial institutions with significant 
resources, as well as a large group of volunteers. For example, senior Google administrators 
in Zurich contacted him shortly following the launch of the CRM offering their services. At 
the peak of its operation, more than 100 volunteers from seven countries maintained the 
CRM, tweeting and retweeting essential data, removing redundant data and updating the 
visual interface. Many of the local volunteers required training in using open source software 
and other IT skills.  
 
McNamara’s association with an online disaster response stems from a long-standing 
involvement in community search and rescue efforts. After graduating, he worked with the 
Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, where he had responsibility for 
coordinating response teams. Despite ending his contract with CDEM as a result of 
departmental restructuring, he maintained an interest in resourcing urban and regional 
councils with online civil defence capabilities that led him to learn open-source software 
coding.  




Over time, he connected with other like-minded volunteers that represented a new class of 
lay-experts forming international groups such as Crisis Commons, Crisis Mappers and 
HumanitarianOpenStreetMap. This gave him reciprocal access to the group’s social resources 
and expertise during the Christchurch disaster that enabled a quick mobilization of effort. 
Despite lacking a formal connection to NZ civil defence systems, McNamara’s continuing 
employment in various roles within the public sector provided him with an eclectic 
knowledge of government structures and policies, which allowed him, he said, to navigate 
bureaucratic hurdles and expectations in the design and operation of CRM. For example, he 
and his colleagues avoided the use of official government or corporate logos, chose different 
colour codes from the Civil Defence’s blue and yellow, and generally avoided any signs or 
visual markers that might confuse users about the website’s status and identity. 
 
Government Websites and Social Media Use Numerous	  government	  websites	  were	  used	  in	  response	  to	  the	  22	  February	  earthquake	  and	  an	  earlier	  earthquake	  on	  4	  September.	  Prior	  to	  the	  first	  event,	  the	  government	  had	  three	   primary	   earthquake-­‐‑related	   government	   websites.	   The	   NZ	   Ministry	   of	   Civil	  Defence	  &	  Emergency	  Management,	  Earthquake	  Commission,	  and	  GNS	  Science	  are	  the	  lead	   agencies	   responsible	   for	   delivering	   and	  managing	   each	   service.	   The	   Earthquake	  Commission,	  a	  Crown	  entity	  established	  by	  the	  Earthquake	  Commission	  Act	  1993,	  has	  three	  primary	  functions:	  to	  provide	  natural	  disaster	  insurance	  for	  residential	  property;	  to	  administer	  the	  Natural	  Disaster	  Fund;	  and,	  to	  support	  research	  on	  natural	  disasters	  and	   impact	   mitigation.	   The	   Commission	   and	   GNS	   Science	   share	   responsibility	   for	  delivering	   a	   website,	   Geonet,	   that	   distributes	   information	   on	   oceanic,	   climatic	   and	  geological	  activity,	   including	  potential	  hazards.	  Other	  government	  websites	  concerned	  with	   emergency	   preparedness,	   disaster	   recovery,	   historic	   events,	   and	   science	   and	  education	  also	  carried	  earthquake-­‐‑related	  information.	  	  Following	   the	   September	   4	   earthquake,	   an	   additional	   eight	   earthquake-­‐‑related	  government	  websites	  appeared.	  The	  lead	  agencies	  responsible	  for	  these	  sites	  included	  Environment	   Canterbury,	   the	   Christchurch	   City	   Council,	   Housing	   NZ,	   the	   Ministry	   of	  Social	   Development	   and	   the	   Prime	   Minister’s	   Office.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   plethora	   of	  existing	  and	  newly	  created	  government	  websites,	  a	  number	  of	  government	  departments	  and	  agencies	  also	  began	  carrying	  earthquake	  related	  information.	  	  	  Twitter	   also	   featured	   in	   the	  national	   and	   local	   government	   earthquake	   response	  with	  5000	  messages	  tweeted	  in	  the	  three	  weeks	  following	  the	  February	  earthquake	  (Bourk	  &	  Holland	   2014,	   37).	   Many	   of	   the	   government	   messages	   were	   retweeted	   across	   user	  networks,	   greatly	   increasing	   their	   reach.	   Bourk	   and	   Holland	   found	   Government	   staff	  used	  Twitter	  to	  correct	  erroneous	  information	  and	  answer	  questions	  from	  the	  affected	  communities	   concerning	   a	   range	   of	   issues,	   including	   power	   services,	   sanitation	   and	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road	   closures.	   To	   maintain	   consistency	   and	   accuracy,	   all	   responses	   were	   managed	  through	  the	  Public	  Information	  Manager	  at	  the	  Crisis	  Response	  Centre	  in	  Christchurch.	  	  
 
Analysis Our	   participants	   recognized	   the	   importance	   of	   new	   media	   and	   communication	  technologies	   during	   disasters	   but	   there	   were	   barriers	   to	   this	   recognition	   being	  translated	  into	  workable	  day-­‐‑to-­‐‑day	  relationships	  between	  official	  systems	  and	  those	  of	  emergent	   citizen	   groups.	   Our	   analysis	   of	   the	   qualitative	   interview	   data	   revealed	  recurring	  interdependent	  themes:	  	  	  
o Information	  and	  identity	  control:	  contrasting	  and	  often	  changing	  assumptions	  about	  information	  provision	  and	  citizen	  reception	  during	  disasters;	  	  	  
o Generalised	  versus	  localised	  information;	  differences	  in	  meeting	  the	  perceived	  information	  needs	  of	  citizens	  and	  the	  opportunities	  for	  interactive	  communication;	  	  	  
o Transparency	  and	  trust;	  differences	  in	  investing	  trust	  in	  citizens	  in	  disaster	  communications;	  and	  	  	  
o Blurring	  of	  the	  lines	  of	  expertise;	  differences	  in	  reconceiving	  the	  boundaries	  between	  ‘official’	  and	  ‘crowd-­‐‑sourced’	  information	  and	  expertise.	  	  	  	  	  
Information and identity control  Our	  participants	  pointed	  to	  barriers	   in	  creating	  relationships	  between	  official	  systems	  and	   those	   of	   emergent	   citizen	   groups.	   CRM’s	   McNamara	   suggested	   that	   within	   New	  Zealand’s	  Civil	  Defence	  Management	   sector	   there	   is	   a	   strong	  emphasis	   on	   community	  development	   including	   enabling	   communities	   to	   create	   their	   own	   solutions.	   But,	   in	  practice,	   this	   presents	   challenges	   to	   established	   ways	   of	   doing	   things.	   One	   such	  challenge	  centres	  on	  accepting	  that	  communities	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  take	  ownership	  of	  their	  own	  issues.	  	  During	   the	   Christchurch	   earthquake,	   there	   was	   uncertainty	   and	   lack	   of	   clarity	   about	  where	  CRM	  fitted	  into	  the	  overall	  scheme:	  what	  was	  its	  role;	  was	  it	  encroaching	  on	  the	  Civil	  Defence	  site	  and	  other	  agencies?	  Some	  of	  the	  initial	  hesitation	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Civil	  Defence	  was	   connected	   to	   concern	   that	   the	   information	   being	   published	   on	   the	   CRM	  could	   potentially	   cause	   harm	   because	   it	   had	   not	   necessarily	   passed	   through	   official	  filtering	  channels.	  	  	  	  
Bourk, Holland and Blood  
 
 38 
The	   spread	   of	  misinformation	   during	   disasters	   could	   have	   serious	   consequences,	   and	  thus	  ensuring	  the	  accuracy	  and	  integrity	  of	  information	  is	  a	  key	  concern	  for	  emergency	  management	  practitioners	  and	  government	  agencies.	  In	  reflecting	  on	  the	  perception	  of	  CRM	   within	   Civil	   Defence,	   one	   government	   official	   suggested	   their	   initial	   hesitation	  centred	  on	   the	   twin	  concerns	   that	  CRM	   information	  could	  potentially	  cause	  harm	  and	  create	   confusion	   among	   those	   affected.	   In	   particular,	   that	   people	  might	   confuse	   CRM	  with	  official	   information	  and	   thereby	   threaten	   the	   integrity	  of	  government	  authorised	  information	   and	   its	   control	   of	   the	   flow	  of	   that	   information	   to	   the	   public.	   This	   in	   turn	  reflects	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  information	  provided	  by	  CRM.	  	  	  	  The	   principal	   concern	   about	   CRM	   was	   directly	   linked	   to	   its	   nature	   as	   a	   community	  sourced	   information	   site	   rather	   than	  a	   government	   site.	  McNamara	   sought	   to	   remedy	  concerns	   about	   this	   and	   the	   verification	   of	   information	   with	   both	   a	   disclaimer	  acknowledging	  their	  site	  was	  not	  official	  and	  by	  including	  a	  signpost	  to	  the	  Civil	  Defence	  site.	  	  Verifying	   the	   accuracy	   of	   reports	   generated	   by	   social	   media	   is	   a	   critical	   concern	   of	  officials	  and	  those	  engaged	  in	  Crisis	  Commons	  and	  related	  activities.	  The	  processes	  by	  which	   Civil	   Defence	   and	   those	   working	   on	   the	   CRM	   sorted	   through	   and	   filtered	  incoming	   information	   appeared	   to	   be	   similar.	   CRM’s	   technology	   and	   its	   lack	   of	  bureaucratic	  oversight,	  however,	  enabled	  it	  to	  disseminate	  information	  in	  a	  more	  timely	  fashion	   than	   official	   sites.	  McNamara	   described	   how	   they	   configured	   CRM	   to	   retrieve	  any	   report	  mentioning	   keywords	   EQ,	   NZ,	   Christchurch	   and	   earthquake	   from	   Twitter,	  from	  which	  they	  filtered	  about	  12,000	  map	  data	  items	  from	  more	  than	  a	  half	  a	  million	  incoming	  messages.	  	  	  	  	  	  It	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   labelling	   information	   as	   verified	   or	   unverified	   could	   signal	   to	  citizens	  that	  a	  verification	  process	  was	  in	  place.	  Equally,	  it	  might	  also	  be	  that	  people	  are	  more	   likely	   to	   think	   critically	   if	   they	   know	   the	   information	   they	   are	   accessing	   is	  unfiltered	  or	  unverified.	  This	  fundamental	  tension	  was	  the	  essence	  of	  CRM’s	  mission;	  to	  capture	   and	   disseminate	   information	   as	   it	   emerged	   rather	   than	   waiting	   for	   official	  verification.	   The	   IT	   professional	  who	   advised	   government	  was	   in	   Christchurch	   at	   the	  time	  of	   the	  earthquake	  and	  described	  how	  CRM	  provided	  timely	   localised	   information	  for	  addressing	  immediate	  necessities:	  	   So	  we	  had	  no	  power	  for	  five	  days,	  we	  had	  no	  water	  for	  two	  weeks,	  we	  had	  no	  sewage	  for	  two	  and	  a	  half	  weeks.	  	  So	  I	  needed	  to	  know	  things	  like	  where	  can	   I	   go	  and	   fill	  up	  my	  gas	  bottle,	   and	  where	  can	   I	   collect	  water?	  And,	   so,	  that	   data	   is	   not	   perfect,	   but	   it	   exists,	   it’s	   much	   better	   than	   nothing.	   (IT	  professional	  and	  advisor)	  	  	  	  Numerous	  studies	  of	  risk	  communication	  identify	  the	  importance	  of	  informing	  citizens	  about	  uncertainties	  rather	  than	  leaving	  an	  information	  vacuum	  or	  seeking	  to	  project	  a	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level	  of	  certainty	  when	  it	  does	  not	  exist.	  An	  overly	  contrived	  or	  managed	  presentation	  of	  information	   may	   be	   deemed	   disingenuous	   and	   insincere,	   thereby	   limiting	   its	  effectiveness	  (Crowe,	  2012,	  257).	  The	  time	  that	  it	  can	  take	  for	  information	  to	  be	  filtered	  and	   verified	   through	   official	   channels	   and	   finally	   packaged	   for	   public	   consumption	  inevitably	  leaves	  a	  vacuum	  and,	  even	  after	  having	  gone	  through	  these	  official	  processes,	  information	  will	   still	   inevitably	   be	   partial	   and	   incomplete.	   	   The	   IT	   professional	   noted	  that	   since	   the	   earthquake	   some	   civil	   defence	   centres	   had	   invested	   more	   time	   and	  resources	   in	   training,	   consulting	   Google	   and	   collaborating	  with	   peer	   organizations	   to	  establish	  closer	  relations	  between	  state	  and	  IT	  professionals.	  	  	  Knowledge	  about	  how	  the	  Ushahidi	  platform	  worked	   in	  real-­‐‑time	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  obstacle	   to	   a	   collaborative	   and	   coordinated	   relationship	   between	   CRM	   and	   official	  agencies.	   Ironically,	   the	   response	   McNamara	   received	   when	   he	   tried	   to	   arrange	   a	  meeting	   with	   officials,	   ‘Because	   we	   are	   in	   an	   emergency	   response	   situation,	   we	   are	  unable	   to	   meet	   with	   you’	   clearly	   underscores	   the	   importance	   of	   ensuring	   that	  relationships	  are	  in	  place	  and	  roles	  understood	  before	  a	  crisis.	  This	  echoes	  the	  critical	  importance	  Palttala	  at	   al.	   (2012)	  place	   in	  disaster	  preparedness	   that	  empowers	   those	  citizens	  directly	  affected	  and	  strengthens	  their	  self-­‐‑efficacy.	  	  	  One	  government	  official	  reflected	  on	  the	  seriousness	  of	  the	  crisis	  and	  how	  agencies	  such	  as	  Civil	  Defence	  should	  consider	  community	  sourced	  information:	  	   at	  the	  time	  because	  of	  the	  magnitude	  of	  what	  was	  going	  on,	  everybody	  just	  went,	  no;	  too	  hard;	  we	  can’t	  deal	  with	  that	  right	  now.	  It’s	  all	  too	  new;	  it’s	  all	  too	   different;	   it’s	   a	   little	   bit	   uncertain;	   who	   is	   this	   Ushahidi;	   what’s	   this	  platform?	  (Government	  official)	  
	  Later	   in	   the	   interview	   the	  official	   acknowledged	   that	   centralized	   control	  went	  against	  the	   grain	   of	   these	   new	   localized	   platforms.	  While	   emergent	   citizen	   groups	   that	   build	  themselves	  around	  new	  online	   technologies	  may	  not	  need	   the	   ‘semi-­‐‑official	   stamp’,	   to	  use	  this	  official’s	  words,	  they	  suggested	  some	  government	  support	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  that	  such	  platforms	  are	  adequately	  resourced	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  next	  disaster.	  	  	  Another	  government	  official,	  while	  accepting	   ‘those	  sorts	  of	   things	  as	  useful’	   reflected	  on	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   initiatives	   like	   CRM	   ought	   to	   be	   controlled,	   or	   brought	   into	  existing	  systems,	  or	  allowed	  to	  evolve	  organically,	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  people	  using	  them	  will	  be	  able	  to	  put	  them	  in	  their	  correct	  context	  and	  act	  responsibly	  on	  the	  information	  provided. 	   	  
Generalised versus localised information	  A	  familiar	  topic	  in	  our	  conversations	  with	  participants	  involved	  differences	  between	  the	  range	  of	  information	  provided	  by	  official	  agencies	  and	  that	  provided	  by	  CRM.	  The	  term	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used	  by	  one	  government	  official	  was	  ‘a	  broad	  spectrum	  of	  information	  needs	  at	  times	  of	  crisis’—that	   is	   distinguishing	   between	   broader	   national	   strategic	   information	   needs	  (such	  as	  impact	  of	  the	  disaster	  on	  the	  economy)	  and	  what	  may	  be	  useful	  at	  street	  level	  (what	  pharmacies	  are	  open).	  	  	  Predictably,	   McNamara,	   ever	   keen	   to	   promote	   open-­‐‑sourced	   community	   information,	  was	  blunt	  in	  his	  assessment	  that	  people	  did	  not	  necessarily	  need	  press	  releases.	  Nor	  did	  they	  need	  to	  know	  about	  things	  such	  as	  portable	  toilets	  in	  their	  neighbourhood,	  which	  were	  clearly	  visible.	  CRM	  focussed	  on	  disseminating	   information	  on	  essential	   services	  and	  their	  times	  of	  operation	  such	  as	  pharmacies,	  petrol	  stations	  and	  water	  deliveries.	  	  Similarly,	   one	   government	   official	   recognized	   the	   importance	   of	   understanding	   and	  effectively	   using	   a	   broad	   spectrum	   of	   communication	   modalities	   for	   multiple	  communities	  to	  meet	  both	  generalized	  information	  and	  more	  localised	  needs—ranging	  from	  those	  physically	  affected	  to	  international	  audiences	  requiring	  accurate	  updates.	  	  But	   there	   was	   also	   cooperation	   between	   official	   sites	   and	   the	   CRM.	   The	   NZ	   Banking	  Federation	   used	   CRM	   to	   signal	   which	   ATMs	   were	   working,	   and	   other	   public	   sector	  organizations	   were	   involved	   including	   the	   well-­‐‑known	   NZ	   appliance	   manufacturer	  Fisher	  and	  Paykel	  who	  asked	  CRM	  to	  publicise	  that	  affected	  people	  could	  use	  washing	  machines	  set	  up	  at	  their	  warehouses.	  	  	  In	   this	   context,	   one	  government	  official	   recognised	   that	  CRM	  and	   similar	  open	   source	  platforms	  did	   fill	  a	  gap	   in	  official	   information	  because	   it	  was	  community	  sourced,	  and	  therefore	   more	   localised,	   and	   timely.	   And	   McNamara	   did	   see	   different	   roles	   for	  government	  sites	  and	  sites	  like	  CRM:	  	   Now,	  if	  we	  can	  take	  some	  of	  the	  burden,	  or	  if	  the	  community	  can	  take	  some	  of	  the	  burden	  for	  distributing	  local,	  rapid,	  highly—you	  know,	  highly	  variable	  
information,	   it	   means	   that	   officials	   hopefully	   should	   be	   able	   to	   focus	   on	  getting	  the	  picture	  right.	  	  (Our	  emphasis)	  	  
Transparency and trust  While	  social	  media	  has	  opened	  up	  new	  ways	  of	   capturing	  and	  presenting	   information	  during	   disasters,	   its	   proliferation	   raises	   serious	   questions	   about	   the	   possibility	   and	  desirability	  of	  establishing	  hierarchies	  of	  source	  credibility.	  Consistent	  with	  the	  work	  of	  Palen	   at	   el.	   (2010),	   there	   was	   evidence	   of	   tension	   between	   a	   centralized	   top-­‐‑down	  model	   of	   disaster	   communication	   and	  an	   inclusive	  public	  participatory	  model	  using	   a	  citizen-­‐‑distributed	  information	  system	  such	  as	  CRM.	  	  	  Our	   participants	   raised	   issues	   not	   only	   about	   the	   speed	   at	   which	   information	   was	  provided	  through	  these	  competing	  modalities	  but	  also	  the	  style	  of	  the	  information	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  reception,	  including	  perceptions	  of	  the	  credibility	  and	  trustworthiness	  of	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sources.	   	   As	   McNamara	   concedes,	   this	   approach	   not	   only	   requires	   investing	   faith	   in	  citizens	  to	  determine	  what	  is	  worthy	  of	  their	  attention	  but	  to	  be	  risk-­‐‑tolerant:	  	   We	  respect	  that	  people	  have	  their	  own	  judgment	  and	  we	  are	  willing	  to	  take	  the	  risk	  that	  it	  could	  be	  misinformation	  .	  .	  .	  people	  communicate	  all	  the	  time,	  and	  they	  detect	  lies	  all	  the	  time.	  	  Our	  brain	  is	  very	  good	  at	  detecting	  lies.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Yet	   the	   risks	   are	   real.	   Government	   officials	   are	   genuinely	   concerned	   that	  misinformation	  may	  lead	  to	  subsequent	  harm,	  and	  in	  a	  crisis	  situation	  that	  harm	  could	  be	   catastrophic.	   	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	  McNamara	   recognises	   this	   but,	   on	   the	   other,	   he	   is	  willing	   to	   ‘push	   the	   burden	   downstream’,	   as	   he	   puts	   it,	   in	   letting	   people	   actively	  interpret	  and	  manage	  information.	  But	  he	  is	  reflexively	  clear	  about	  official	  information:	  	   if	   I	  was	   in	   another	   country,	   say,	   I	  would	   always	   hunt	   for	   the	   government	  sources.	   If	   they	  were	   deficient,	   I	   would	   then	   go	   somewhere	   else.	   I	  mean,	  you’d—but	  you’d	  always	  want	  to	  go	  to	  the	  original	  source.	  	  	  	  	  
Blurring	  the	  lines	  of	  expertise	  The	  nature	  of	  expertise	  and	  the	  way	   in	  which	  a	  crisis	  brings	   to	   the	   fore	  new	  forms	  of	  expertise,	  emerged	  as	  a	  key	  theme	  in	  the	  interviews.	  	  One	  government	  official	  reflexively	  observed	  a	  shift	  from	  an	  initial	  sense	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  caution	  within	  Civil	  Defence	  to	  a	  gradual	  recognition	  that	  the	  CRM	  was	  fulfilling	  a	  significant	   role	   in	  providing	   localised,	  detailed,	   timely	  and	  specific	   information,	  which	  his	  own	  agency	  was	  unable	  to	  do.	  	   I	  don’t	  think	  there	  was	  a	  clearly,	  sort	  of,	  defined	  set	  of	  boundaries	  in	  place.	  	  That,	  kind	  of,	  got	  established	  as	  things	  happened	  but	  it	  probably	  took	  days,	  if	  not	  a	  week	  or	  two,	  for	  things	  to	  settle	  down.	  So	  initially	  there	  might	  have	  been	  some	  hesitation	  from	  the	  Civil	  Defence	  team	  here.	   .	   .	   .	  They’re	  (CRM)	  playing	   in	   slightly	   different	   spaces;	   the	   target	   audience	   had	   a	   big—big	  overlap,	  but	  the	  guys	  that	  were	  in	  the	  CrisisCommons	  were	  able	  to	  get	  down	  to	   a	   much	  more	   localised	   and—and	   specific	   layer	   of	   detail.	   (Government	  Official)	  	  Unlike	   CRM’s	   volunteer	   supported	   effort	   there	  was	   a	   sense	   in	  which	   NZ	   government	  agencies	   responded	   to	   the	   earthquake	   in	   a	   much	   less	   coordinated	   and	   user-­‐‑friendly	  way,	   which	   may	   have	   contributed	   to	   confusion	   within	   the	   community.	   As	   one	  government	  official	  put	  it:	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every	   government	   agency	   in	   town	   (Christchurch)	   had	   created	   a	   website,	  you	  know,	  basically	  for	  their	  sector	  of	  helping	  the	  earthquake	  [Government	  official]	  	  There	  was	  some	  level	  of	  bemusement	  about	  the	  central	  government’s	  decision	  to	  create	  a	  new	  website	  Canterburyeathquake.govt.nz	   in	  response	  to	   the	  earthquake,	  given	  that	  much	  of	  the	  information	  that	  would	  appear	  on	  it	  would	  already	  have	  been	  available	  on	  existing	   websites.	   One	   government	   official	   commented	   that	   the	   imperatives	   of	  government	   authorities	  may	   not	   put	   them	   in	   the	   best	   position	   to	   use	   the	   internet	   in	  crisis	  situations:	  	   And	  it	  was,	  kind	  of,	  like,	  well	  sorry	  Prime	  Minister,	  maybe	  you	  don’t	  actually	  know	  the	  best	  way	  to	  arrange	  things	  on	  the	  Internet.	  (Government	  official)	  	  Multiple	   government	  websites	  were	   also	   seen	   by	   this	   official	   as	   a	   potential	   source	   of	  confusion,	  but	  his	  position	  was	  grounded	  in	  the	  harsh	  reality	  of	  the	  crisis	  as	  he	  noted,	  ‘people	  ‘were	  running	  from	  falling	  buildings	  and	  making	  sure	  they	  had	  a	  roof	  over	  their	  heads’.	  	  Despite	   all	   the	   resources	   of	   government	   there	   appeared	   to	   be	   a	   view	   that	   it	  was	   not	  well-­‐‑positioned	  to	  facilitate	  something	  like	  the	  CRM.	  Yet,	  the	  following	  comment	  from	  a	  government	   official	   does	   hint	   at	   the	   need	   for	   future	   government	   responses	   to	  emergencies	   to	   include	   working	   more	   closely	   with	   local	   communities	   by	   potentially	  tapping	  into	  the	  volunteer	  market:	  	   We	  don’t	   have	   that,	   sort	   of,	   size	   and	  budgets	   available	   so	  we	  are	   going	   to	  have	   to	   tap	   into	   the	   volunteer	   market	   more.	   How	   do	   we	   leverage	   that	  through	  the	  various	  local	  Civil	  Defence	  groups?	  (Government	  official)	  
	  Of	  importance	  to	  establishing	  future	  dialogue	  between	  government	  and	  citizen	  groups	  is	   the	  need	   to	   rethink	  assumptions	  about	  what	  constitutes	   relevant	  expert	  knowledge	  and	   expertise.	   For	   example,	   McNamara	   said	   just	   because	   the	   volunteers	   who	  contributed	   to	   the	   CRM	   were	   not	   being	   paid	   did	   not	   mean	   that	   they	   were	   any	   less	  qualified	  or	  committed	  to	  their	  tasks:	  	   I	   think	  the	   lessons	  for	  community	   is	   that	  there	  are	  now	  tools	  available	   for	  you	   to	   support	   yourselves	   .	   .	   .	   the	   designation	   of	   lay	   people	   or	   volunteer	  effort	  does	  not	  mean	  unqualified,	  it	  doesn’t	  mean	  unaware,	  it	  doesn’t	  mean	  unsavvy	  necessarily.	  	  	  Thus,	  McNamara	   also	   challenged	   the	   value	   of	   dichotomies	   such	   as	   ‘expert	   versus	   lay’	  when	  he	  referred	  to	  the	  buy-­‐‑in	  CRM	  had	  from	  some	  official	  sources,	  such	  as	  the	  Banking	  Federation	  who	   used	   the	  website	   to	   provide	   updates	   on	   the	   status	   of	   ATMs.	   And	   the	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usefulness	  of	  CRM	  also	  depended	  upon	  the	  goodwill	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  especially	   in	  volunteer	  expert	  technical	  support.	  	  Clearly,	  the	  concept	  of	  emergence	  is	  central	  to	  disaster	  response.	  Disasters	  challenge	  the	  assumptions	  of	  predictability	  and	  the	  capacity	  for	  technical	  expertise	  to	  know,	  control	  and	  manage	  emergent	  events	  because	  of	  the	  inherent	  uncertainty.	  This	  complicates	  the	  boundaries	  between	  expert	  and	   lay,	  or	  expert	  and	  specialist	   lay,	  expertise.	  McNamara	  gave	  the	  example	  of	  trusting	  a	  text	  message	  accompanied	  by	  date-­‐‑stamped,	  geo-­‐‑coded	  photographs	  from	  the	  ground	  more	  than	  he	  would	  trust	  an	  official	  report:	  	   Officialdom—official	   doesn’t	   mean	   correct;	   official	   means	   it’s	   come	   from	  officials	   .	   .	   .	   official	   information	   should	   not	   be	   trustworthy	   because	   it’s	  official;	   it	   should	   be	   trustworthy	   because	   the	   information	   itself	   is	  trustworthy.	  It	  should	  have	  good	  sources.	  It	  should	  be	  internally	  consistent	  .	  .	   .	   it	   should	   be	   verified	   in	   some	  way.	   	   I	  mean,	   the	   truth	  worthiness	   or—I	  mean,	   there's	   a	   high	   degree	   of,	   ah,	   correlation	   between	   truthfulness	   and	  officialdom,	  but	  there—there's	  no	  necessary,	  ah—there's	  no	  necessary	  link	  there.	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  willingness	  to	  bracket	  one’s	  predispositions	  about	  what	  constitutes	  trustworthy	  or	  authoritative	  information	  was	  evident	  in	  one	  of	  our	  interviewee’s	  reflections	  about	  how	  government	  agencies	  might	  have	  been	  able	  to	  fruitfully	  engage	  with	  CRM:	  	   could	  we,	  you	  know,	  endorse	  some	  of	  the	  information	  that	  their	  site	  (CRM)	  was	   putting	   up;	   could	   we	   re-­‐‑tweet	   some	   of	   the	   information	   they	   were	  putting	  up;	  could	  we	  even	  start	  directing	  people	  to	  the	  site	  as	  a,	  you	  know,	  if	  you	  want,	  local,	  more	  real	  time	  information;	  you	  know,	  start	  lodging	  reports	  here	  because	  it’s	  actually	  a	  useful	  tool?	  [Government	  official]	  	  The	  official	  added	  that	  the	  value	  of	  CRM	  was	  that	  agencies	  like	  Civil	  Defence	  could	  focus	  on	   the	   core	   issue	   of	   managing	   events.	   There	   was	   a	   sense	   of	   gratitude	   toward	  CrisisCommons	  for	  providing	  a	  service	  that	  his	  own	  team	  was	  not	  equipped	  or	  able	  to	  do	  at	  the	  time	  because	  its	  focus	  was	  on	  other	  areas:	  	   I	   could	  see	  a	  value	   in	  doing	   it	  and	  partly	  because	   I	  could	  also	  see	   that	   the	  main	  Civil	  Defence	   team	  here	  was	   in	  no	  head	   space	   for	  dealing	  with	   that;	  and	  we	  weren’t	   resourced	   to	   deal	  with	   it	   .	   .	   .	   we	   had	   about	   eight	   people,	  we’re	   trying	   to	   provide	   24	   hour	   a	   day,	   seven	   day	   a	   week	   coverage—we	  couldn’t	   do	   that	   and	   also	   take	   care	   of,	   you	   know,	   validating	   all	   of	   these	  localised	  reports	  and—and—and,	  sort	  of,	  vetting	  the—the	  slightly	  dubious	  information	  out.	  (Government	  official)	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Discussion  CRM’s	   efforts	   were	   developed	   by	   local,	   national	   and	   international	   volunteers	   as	   an	  immediate	   response	   to	   the	   earthquake	   crisis	   and	   the	   perceived	   need	   for	   location-­‐‑focused	   rather	   than	   topic	   or	   service	   focused	   information.	   They	   involved	   rapidly	  processing,	   repackaging	   and	   adding	   value	   to	   available	   information	   from	   social	  media	  (especially	   Twitter)	   and	   official	   agencies	   in	   the	   form	   of	   populating	   a	   visual	  representation	  of	  this	  data.	  A	  key	  goal	  was	  to	  keep	  information	  current	  and	  flowing.	  	  While	   new	   online	   platforms	   like	   CRM	   are	   facilitating	   more	   grass-­‐‑roots,	   interactive	  communicative	   styles	   during	   crises,	   the	   tendency	   for	   governments	   to	   favour	   a	  centralised	  model	  of	  information	  delivery	  grounded	  in	  risk	  aversion	  and	  accountability	  is	   a	   potential	   barrier	   to	   enabling	   an	   active	   role	   for	   emergent	   citizens	   groups.	  Conceptualization	   of	   disaster	   communication	   among	   emergency	   management	  practitioners	   and	   government	   agencies	   still	   tends	   to	   be	   based	   on	   a	   conduit	   model	  (Pechta,	  Brandenburg	  and	  Seeger	  2010).	  	  Disasters	   by	   their	   nature	   break	   down	   boundaries,	   creating	   challenges	   for	   existing	  official	   crisis	   response	   and	   communication	   systems.	   The	   importance	   of	  maintaining	   a	  lead	  agency	  with	  an	  authoritative	  voice	  that	  can	  act	  as	  a	  reference	  point	  in	  the	  context	  of	  several	  different	  information	  sources	  still	  remains.	  Yet,	  as	  this	  case	  study	  reveals,	  there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  rethink	  or	  recast	  established	  hierarchies	  of	  information	  value	  and	  flow	  and	  the	  assumptions	  and	  expectations	  that	  underpin	  them.	  	  	  The	   notion	   of	   emergence	   is	   critical	   in	   a	   dynamic,	   often	   changing,	   disaster	   response.	  Emergence	   provides	   an	   informative	  way	   of	   thinking	   about	   the	   value	   of	   crowd	   source	  tools	  for	  facilitating	  dialogue	  among	  and	  between	  citizens	  and	  government	  agencies.	  A	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  processes	  behind	  particular	  initiatives	  may	  lead	  to	  greater	  awareness	   and	   acceptance	   of	   crowd	   source	   tools	   and	   ways	   of	   responding	   to	   the	  challenges	  they	  present	  to	  established	  governmental	  ways	  of	  operating.	  	  Clearly,	   there	  are	   real	   concerns	  about	   the	  potential	   for	   information	  overload	  with	   the	  increasing	  number	  of	  people	  involved	  in	  disseminating	  information	  during	  an	  emerging	  disaster.	   New	   communication	   platforms	   create	   opportunities	   for	   representing	   data,	  including	   official	   data,	   in	   new	   and	   accessible	   ways.	   But	   just	   because	   these	  representations	  have	  not	  been	   filtered	  and	  verified	   through	  official	   channels	  does	  not	  necessarily	   mean	   the	   information	   is	   inaccurate	   or	   not	   meeting	   a	   local	   need	   that	   is	  unsatisfied	  by	  official	  agencies.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  In	   conclusion,	   our	   research	   strengthens	   the	   argument	   that	   relationships	   between	  government	   agencies	   and	   civic-­‐‑minded	   lay	   specialists	   need	   to	   be	   already	   in	   place	   to	  leverage	  all	  available	  skills	  and	  resources	  during	  emergencies,	  which	  illustrates	  Palttala	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Notes 1. An	   earlier	   version	   of	   this	   paper,	   ‘Crisis	   Commons	   and	   the	   2011	   Christchurch	  Earthquake’	  was	  presented	   to	   the	   annual	   conference,	  Emergency	  Media	   and	  Public	  Affairs,	   Canberra,	   2-­‐‑3	   June.	   At	   this	   time	   data	   gathering	   and	   analysis	   had	   not	   been	  completed.	  	  	  	  
2. Some	   images	   of	   the	   Christchurch	   Recovery	  Map	   are	   still	   available	   on	   the	   Internet.	  Search	  ‘Christchurch	  Recovery	  Map’.	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